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This paper analyses the effect of cultural differences amongst ethnic groups on the remittance 
behaviour of native and immigrant households in Canada. In contrast to the New Economic of 
Labour Migration (NELM) literature that examines remittance motivation in the framework 
of extended family agreements, we embed remittances in a formal demand system, suggesting 
that they represent expenditures on social relations with relatives and/or friends and contribute 
to membership in social/religious organizations respectively. The results indicate strong 
ethnic group cultural differences in the remittance behaviour of recent Asian immigrant 
households and highlight the importance of differentiating with respect to cultural background 
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The literature on household money transfers to persons outside the household is substantial, 
analysing the remittance behaviour mainly in terms of motivation. These are categorised to be 
either altruism, self-interest, exchange, co-insurance or loan-agreements between extended 
family members (Lucas and Stark 1985). 
The motivation models make different predictions about the effect of specific 
determinants on remittances. For example, under the altruistic hypothesis (i.e. the migrant 
cares about the relatives left behind), once the migrant's income is taken into account, the 
education level should not have an effect on remittances (Rapoport and Docquier 2006). 
Under the exchange hypothesis, i.e. remittances "buy" various types of services like taking 
care of the migrant's relatives or his assets in the home country, the education level is 
expected to have a negative impact on remittances as educated migrants have a lower 
propensity to return and thus reunite with their families in the host country and invest less in 
home country assets (Cox 1987). While under the informal family loan hypothesis, more 
educated migrants are expected to remit more in order to repay for the initial investment made 
by the family in their education (Poirine 1997; Cox et al. 1998; Ilahi and Jafarey 1999). 
To date, most studies focus on analysing remittance receiving households in a 
particular migrant sending country and the empirical results are quite diverging: confirming or 
contradicting the predictions of one or the other remittance motivation models. For example, 
Lucas and Stark (1985) established that remittances received by households in Botswana rose 
significantly with the migrant's years of schooling. The effect is even stronger among the 
recipient household head's own young (i.e. children, grandchildren, nephews, and nieces), 
giving support to the notion that remittances are partially a result of an understanding to repay 
initial educational investment. Similarly, Cox et al. (1998) found evidence for the loan 
repayment hypothesis by analysing remittance receiving households in Peru and 
distinguishing between parents-to-children and children-to-parents transfers. On the other 
hand, Brown's (1997) estimation results illustrate that Western Samoan migrants to Australia 
(conversely to migrants from Tonga) remitted more if they received financial assistance from 
their relatives at home for migration proposes. However, he found no evidence that the level 
of education attainment could be associated with any difference in remittance behaviour. 
Research to date suggests that these observed differences in remittance behaviour 
might be caused by cultural differences in social and/or family norms. Nevertheless, little 
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systematic research has been done so far on the effect of ethnic group cultural differences on 
the remittance behaviour of households.1 
As reflected by the Canadian Ethnic Diversity Survey (2003), Canadian ethnic groups 
exhibit differential contact with their relatives in their country of origin. For example, 62% of 
those of Filipino ancestry reported monthly or more frequent contact with their relatives 
compared to 46% of those of Chinese, 31% of those of Italian and 20% of those of German 
origin.2 And such differences are determined, at least partially, by cultural differences in 
social/family norms. For example, Elliott and Gray (2000) explain in a report for the New 
Zealand Immigration Service that the responsibility to care for parents and grandparents is a 
key component of the family systems in South and South East Asia. Similarly, in Oceania 
young adults are expected to contribute to both nuclear and extended family commitments. 
Conversely, in Western societies such family obligations are less important because they have 
been replaced by well developed social security and financial systems. 
This paper builds on this literature by assessing the effect of ethnic group cultural 
differences on the remittances behaviour of native and immigrant households in Canada. For 
several reasons, we consider the Canadian context appropriate for this exercise. Canada's 
foreign-born resident population is large: 5.6 million or about 19% of the total population in 
the 2001 census; the vast majority of these foreign-born residents are admitted into Canada on 
a permanent basis (96%) and due to quick accession to citizenship over 75% of Canada’s 
foreign-born population is naturalised. Canada’s immigrant population is thus quite 
homogeneous in terms of legal resident and citizenship status. However, it is quite diverse in 
terms of ethnicity. Traditional migration sources are countries from Western and Southern 
Europe (i.e. UK, Italy, Germany and Portugal) which in 2001 still made up about 30% of the 
stock of foreign-born population. Nevertheless, in the 1980s and 1990s immigration 
dramatically shifted towards Asian and Central and Eastern European sources, which now 
represent about 38% and 11% of the immigrant population respectively (Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada 2002). 
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
In contrast to extant micro-analysis that models remittance behaviour in the framework of 
informal agreements between extended family members, we embed remittances in a formal 
demand system and suggest that they represent expenditures on social relations with relatives 
and/or friends and contribute to membership in social/religious organizations respectively. 
                                               
1 One exception would be Wolff et al. (2007). 
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This modelling is, nevertheless, consistent with remittance motivation theory, in 
which remittances are expected to influence the social relations between family members too. 
For example in the altruistic model, the degree of altruism of the relatives towards the migrant 
may influence and be influenced by remittances. In the inheritance model, the migrant is 
assumed to send remittances to maintain a good relationship with the parents and, thus, help 
insure a possible inheritance. In the exchange model, remittances "buy" various types of 
services such as taking care of the migrant's relatives or his assets in the home country. In the 
co-insurance model, the financial support provided by the migrant ensures that relatives will 
support him in the future in case of need. Similarly, loan repayments for the investment of the 
family in the initial education and/or migration cost could be regarded as assuring his further 
membership in the family. 
In line with Deaton and Muellbauer (1993), we allow for a two-stage budgeting 
process, in order to characterize the household’s remittance decisions with respect to 
consumption. Thus, in the first stage, the household may allocate total expenditures on 
consumption and on the composite good “social relations outside the household”. In the 
second stage, the expenditures on “social relations outside the household” determined in the 
first stage are distributed between expenditures on social relations with relatives and/or 
friends and contributions to group membership (i.e. membership in a religious, charitable, 
professional group, etc.). The differentiation between the expenditures on the two types of 
social relationships is not only of sociological relevance. The costs involved are also different: 
while contributions to group membership are in the majority of cases tax deductible, transfers 
to relatives are not. 
 
2.1 The demand system 
It is a basic premise of this paper that the act of private remittances is embedded in the 
household’s utility maximization framework and is, thus, a part of the household’s allocation 
process across a general expenditure system. The chosen demand system estimated is the 
Linear Approximate/Almost Ideal Demand System (LA/AIDS) proposed by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980), because it satisfies the microeconomic theory of demand (i.e. allows for 
exact aggregation and the imposition of homogeneity and symmetry restrictions) and permits 
a two-stage budgeting procedure. 
For the ith commodity, the model can be specified as follows: 
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*/lnln       (1) 
where yqpw iii /  is the budget share of the i
th good, jp  is the price of the j
th good, y  
represents total expenditures, and *p  is a Stone price index (i.e.  ii pwp lnln
* ). To 
ensure that this demand system conforms to the utility maximization properties, equation (1) 






























0         (3) 
symmetry: jiij           (4) 
The adding up conditions are ensured by the fact that the budget shares of the goods in the 
system add up to one:  1iw . Homogeneity and symmetry have to be tested and they can 
be parametrically imposed. The LA/AIDS is simple to interpret. In the case of constant 
relative prices and “real” expenditure ( */ py ), the budget shares are constant. This is the 
natural starting point for the predictions using the model. Changes in real expenditures 
operate through i ; these add to zero and are positive for luxuries and negative for necessities. 
Using the estimate i , Engel elasticities can be calculated as follows: 
 iii we 1          (5) 
where ie  is the Engel elasticity and iw
 is the mean share of expenditures on the ith good for 
the entire sample. The Engel elasticity is greater than unity for luxuries, less than unity for 
necessities, and equal to one for normal goods. 
 
2.2 Demographic controls, immigration entry and assimilation 
In the demand analysis for various commodities the LA/AIDS is often supplemented with 
demographic variables in order to reduce the bias due to unobserved household characteristics 
(see Teklu 1996; Adrangi and Raffiee 1997; Meenakshi and Ray 1999). Following this 
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where kX  represents a set of demographic control variables that depict the life-cycle stage of 
the immigrant and Canadian households, i.e. gender, age, education, marital status, household 
size, home ownership, and net change in assets and liabilities (i.e. savings). 
Finally, based on the model of Caroll et al. (1994), the demand system is further 
augmented in order to capture eventual immigration entry and assimilation effects with 
respect to the remittance behaviour of households: 









/lnln    (7) 
where sIG  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the household belongs to immigrant 
group s and zero otherwise. D denotes the duration of the foreign-born household residence in 
Canada. Immigrants are assumed to arrive with a set of cultural values and tastes which are 
different from those of the natives; this is reflected by possible non-zero values for is . Thus, 
the set of parameters is  can be interpreted first as a general immigration entry effect. If is  
differs significantly across immigrant groups, we consider this an evidence for country/region 
specific cultural effects as well. Over time, via assimilation, the behaviour of immigrants may 
become more similar to that of the host group. In our model this would be the case when the 
sign of is  is opposite to the sign of is . In this case, the immigration entry and/or cultural 
effects would vanish after isis   years of residence in the host country. 
 
2.3 Weak separability  
According to Deaton and Muellbauer (1993), a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
second stage of the two-stage budgeting process is weak separability. Weak separability of a 
utility function over a given set of commodities implies that the marginal rate of substitution 
between any two goods within one group of goods is independent of the level of consumption 
of any other group of goods. If this condition holds, then it is correct to specify the demand 
for these product groups separately. The sole connection between the commodity groups is 
via the income or expenditure effect. 
Following Hansen (1993), Allen’s partial elasticities of substitution allow us to test for 
the existence of weak separability. The utility function is weakly separable into the 
commodity groups A and B if two conditions are satisfied: (a) the partial substitution 
elasticities between different commodities of the group A and of the group B are identical, i.e. 





l  and 0
m
m .        (8) 
From the relation between substitution elasticities and compensated price elasticities 
we have: */1 lmmlm w  . The compensated price elasticities are calculated as 
iijjij ww /
*   for ji  . Thus, from the condition (a) we obtain the testable restriction: 
  mllm ww/1 .          (9) 
To test if the conditions (8) and (9) are satisfied, we apply a likelihood ratio (LR) test 
comparing the system of equations with and without the restrictions imposed. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1. Family Expenditure Survey (FAMEX) 
The data sets used for this analysis are taken from the waves 1986 and 1992 of the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FAMEX), Statistics Canada. Data were collected in the form of a 
detailed questionnaire during one or several interviews. Thus, income, expenditure and 
remittance data in the surveys are self-reported. 
The focus of the empirical part of this study is to investigate the possible differential 
patterns of private remittances by Canadian-born and foreign-born households. The Canadian-
born population is used as a reference group since presumably its members have no 
immediate attachments abroad. The survey years 1986 and 1992 are of interest because they 
encompass a dynamic period of expanding Canadian immigration inflows which dramatically 
shifted to Asian source countries.3 The wave 1990 was not included because in comparison to 
1986 and 1992 it has observations only from households in urban areas.4 Data from the year 
1996 were omitted as well because they do not include information on the immigrant’s year 
of arrival, which is assumed to significantly affect remittances. 
Only observations with positive and non-zero income and total expenditures were kept 
in the regressions. Observations with negative expenditures for the different expenditure 
groups and with “masked” or “non-stated” responses for the variables of interest were 
excluded as well.5 In addition, the household head is considered to be the member of the 
household mainly responsible for its financial maintenance (i.e. pays the rent, mortgage, 
property taxes, etc.).6 This definition of the household head will enable us to categorize a 
                                               
3 In 1968 75% of Canadian immigrants came from Western Europe and North America, by 1992 25% came from 
these regions. 
4 A further reason for the omission of the survey year 1990 was the rejection of the test for non-occurrence of 
structural breaks when pooling the 1986, 1990 and 1992 surveys. 
5 Following this screening, a total of 853 observations were excluded. 
6 We assume that this person determines also the household’s expenditure patterns. 
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foreign-born household as one in which the financial maintenance responsibility is borne by a 
foreign-born person. The data from the pooled 1986 and 1992 surveys, given the above 
screening, yield 18,995 surveyed households. 
Data used in this study do not allow us to differentiate between transfers sent inside or 
outside Canada. However, we can distinguish between a transfer to a person and to a charity. 
An inspection of the actual remittance data indicates that some households specialize in the 
type of transferred funds. Specifically, 8.5% of the households remit money exclusively to 
charitable organizations and about 17% remit money only to individuals, while 66% remit to 
both individuals and charitable groups.7 We hypothesize that charitable remittances should 
respond differently to household income since these donations are tax deductible in Canada 
and do not imply a contractual motive to extended family members. 
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics by birth status and for the two survey years 
included in the study: 1986 and 1992. We are able to differentiate between five pre-defined 
population groups: Canadian-born, immigrants from North America and Western Europe, 
from Southern and Eastern Europe, from China, Asia and Oceania, and Others and Non-
Stated.8 The last group was excluded from the analysis since it was deemed too 
heterogeneous. 
 
[Table 1: about here] 
 
Group mean values show that the Asian immigrant population contains more males as 
household heads, is younger and more educated, includes a lower portion of 
separated/divorced household heads, has households with the largest average size, and has a 
significantly shorter immigration history in Canada than the remaining foreign-born groups. 
Also, Asian immigrant households earn the highest average incomes but save least. 
However, the greatest average remittances, both to persons and to charities, are made 
by immigrant households from North America and West Europe. They remitted about 35% 
more than Asian immigrant households in 1992. The North American and West European 
group have the greatest share of household heads separated or divorced (which we assume to 
positively affect remittances to persons) and the greatest income per household member 
(which we assume to positively affect remittances to both persons and charities). 
                                               
7 The remaining 8.5% did not make any remittances. 
8 The geographical origin of the individual is defined in these broad regional groups by the Canadian Family 
Expenditure Survey and there is no additional information about the country of birth. Therefore, a disaggregation 




[Figure 1: about here] 
 
Age of the household head seems to significantly influence the remittance activity of the 
household as well (see Figure 1), however, with differences among the population groups. On 
average Canadian-born and South and East European immigrants make the greatest 
remittances to persons after age 65 (CA$ 1,375/year and CA$ 1,944/year respectively). While 
North American and West European households remit the greatest average amounts between 
age 35 to 64 (CA$ 1,678/year). Only Asian immigrant households keep their average 
remittances to persons quite stable over the whole lifetime. 
As a share of total expenditure, all population groups remit most after age 65. The 
share is the biggest for South and East European (9.5%) and the smallest for Asian 
immigrants (4.7%). Finally, the largest average remittances to charities are made by 




The prices used for eight (out of ten) commodity groups (i.e. Food, Shelter, Household 
Operations and Furnishing, Clothing, Transportation, Personal and Health Care, Recreation, 
Education, and Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverages) included in this study are consumer price 
indices (CPI) that vary over time and across five regions (Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, 
Ontario, Prairies, and British Columbia) and are assumed to be fixed within the regions (see 
Table 2). For Remittances to Persons Outside the Household and Remittances to Charities we 
computed price indices based on the CPIs of the above eight commodity groups. 
 
[Table 2: about here] 
 
We argue that the value of one remitted dollar to a person outside the household equals to one 
dollar of forgone consumption. Thus, we calculated for each household in our sample the 
price index of Remittances to Persons as the sum of the CPIs of the eight expenditure groups 
presented above, weighted by the respective share of the expenditure group in total 
expenditures. 
Charitable donations are tax deductible. Thus, the price for one dollar donated to 
charities equals the value of forgone consumption minus the tax deduction received for the 
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donation of that one dollar. The CPIs for Remittances to Charities are computed as follows: 
   iipohichaor TaxrCPICPI  1100100 ,, . Where: ichaorCPI ,  is the CPI of Remittances to 
Charities for the ith household; ipohCPI ,  is the CPI of Remittances to Persons for the i
th 
household; and iTaxr  stands for the tax rate applicable for the i
th household. The tax rates are 
uniquely computed for each household through a combination of the federal and provincial 
tax rates. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
LA/AIDS is a system of seemingly unrelated equations with identical regressors and cross-
equation restrictions, e.g. jiij   . For estimating the system, therefore, we use Zellner’s 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). For the dependent variable the following must hold: 
 1iw . This restriction implies further restrictions on the right hand side, in particular 
0 i . The residuals are linearly dependent and their covariance matrix is singular.9 Green 
(2002) shows that the solution to the singularity problem is to arbitrarily drop one of the 
equations and estimate the remainder. The residuals covariance matrix of the system with 
1n  equations is non-singular. The coefficients of the nth equation result from the “adding-
up” restriction. Furthermore, in the SUR-model, when all equations have the same regressors, 
the efficient estimator is single-equation ordinary least squares; i.e. GLS is the same as OLS. 
Thus, we use in this analysis SUR and OLS alternatively: SUR in most cases, in particular 
when we impose cross-equation restrictions and OLS for single equation estimation. 
 
4.1 Homogeneity and symmetry 
One of the tasks of this empirical analysis is to test if the restrictions implied by utility theory 
hold for the demand equations when including the unique expenditure items relating to 
remittances. The homogeneity restriction is first tested by using a likelihood ratio (LR) test 
comparing the separate OLS regressions for each commodity group in the study, with and 
without the restriction imposed. Then, we test for homogeneity, symmetry and both 
homogeneity and symmetry by comparing the SUR estimates for the whole system, with and 
without the restrictions imposed. The test is undertaken for both the uncontrolled for 
demographics LA/AIDS model (eq. 1) and the demographics augmented model (eq. 6). 
 
                                               
9 See Hansen (1993). 
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[Table 3: about here] 
 
The test results for the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions are presented in Table 3. Since 
we assumed different expenditure patterns for the four population groups in the study, we 
conducted the tests for each group separately. In fact, different results are generated by the 
restriction tests. In the uncontrolled for demographics setting, when running separate OLS 
regressions, the hypothesis of homogeneity cannot be rejected at the 95% level in six out of 
ten equations in the system for the Canadian-born population, all ten equations for the North 
American and West European and the South and East European immigrant population, and 
nine out of ten equations for the Asian immigrant population. When running the entire 
system, the homogeneity restriction cannot be rejected in the case of the North American and 
West European and the South and East European immigrant groups. Finally, the symmetry 
restriction is rejected at the 99% level for all population groups. 
In the controlled for demographic characteristics setting, the tests for homogeneity and 
symmetry performed similarly. The weak performance of the homogeneity and symmetry 
tests is not necessarily proof of irrational behaviour. In fact, it might have been caused by the 
lack of sufficient cross-variation for the price variables (i.e. the prices vary only between two 
years and five Canadian provinces/regions) and, thus, leads to large standard errors on the 
price parameters. Nevertheless, when estimating the expenditure elasticities we will impose 
the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions (eq. 3 and 4) parametrically in the SUR model. 
 
4.2 Weak separability 
The LR-test results show that weak separability cannot be rejected only in the case of Asian 
immigrant households. The 2 -statistic is 10.84 in an unrestricted setting and 8.93 when 
restricting for homogeneity and symmetry, with both values lower than the 95% level critical 
value. For all other population groups weak separability is rejected by the LR-test. 
This implies that in the case of Asian households remittances to charities are a 
substitute for remittances to persons. This behaviour actually resembles Muslim charity 
traditions. According to the Koran, 2 to 5% of the income should be donated to the poor 
(including extended family members) or an Islamic cause; this Islamic tax is known as Zaqqat 
(ECORIS, 2005). However, Asian immigrants in Canada are predominately from China, 
Hong Kong, India and the Philippines and belong to other religious groups. Therefore, it is 
not straightforward how the above explanation applies to non-Muslim Asian immigrants. 
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Another explanation for the weak separabilty in the case of Asian households is owing 
to the quite low variance in the transfers share to relatives and friends (see sections 4.3 and 
4.4). Because transfers to charities represent only about 20% of the total transfers outside the 
household, their variance has a less significant impact on the weak separablility test results. 
In the remainder of the paper, the demand sub-system for relations with relatives 
and/or friends and group membership is specified for Asian households separately. The 
LA/AIDS system thus contains only two equations (one for the share of remittances to 
persons and one for the share of remittances to charities) and has total remittances as an 
independent argument (instead of total expenditures). 
 
4.3 Expenditure elasticities 
Engel elasticities for Canadian-born and foreign-born residents across income groups are 
estimated in an LA/AIDS system, under an uncontrolled as well as a controlled setting. Table 
4 reports the estimated expenditure elasticities for the pooled 1986 and 1992 surveys without 
imposing restrictions for homogeneity and symmetry.10 The estimated expenditure elasticities 
with restrictions imposed (Table 5) mimic those of the unrestricted estimates. 
If the model is correct and demographic arguments condition remittances then 
significant differences should arise between the controlled and uncontrolled elasticity 
measures. And indeed, expenditure elasticities for remittances to persons and remittances to 
charity/religious groups are in a controlled setting up to two times greater than estimates 
derived in an uncontrolled one. In the remainder of this section we would like to focus on the 
first set of estimates because they reflect the net income effect on the remittance activity more 
accurately. 
 
[Table 4: about here] 
 
[Table 5: about here] 
 
The results are differentiated by foreign-born status and income group to capture any effects 
owing to the immigrant origins or their position in Canada’s income distribution. Given these 
categories, the range of calculated values for the expenditure elasticities for remittances to 
persons greatly exceed unity for the Canadian-born households and the North American and 
                                               
10 Elasticity estimates for the traditional goods on the basis of FAMEX as reported by Didukh (2001, 2002) and 
Geiger (2002) over a wide variety of commodities are within the range reported here. 
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all European immigrant households, which seem to treat social relations to persons outside the 
household as a luxury item. At the same time, elasticity estimates for remittances to persons 
in the Asian case are close to unity, meaning that they consider expenditures in these social 
ties as a normal good. 
The results indicate significant differences in the remittance activity of the population 
groups across the cited income classes and imply that households value differently the 
relationships with relatives and/or friends outside the household, dependent on their cultural 
background. On the one hand, for the North American and all European immigrant 
households, the relationship among the household members (i.e. the nuclear family) appears 
to be of primary importance and only when total household consumption is large enough do 
these households become more generous towards other relatives and friends. On the other 
hand, for Asian households, the remitted share to persons outside the household is more stable 
with changes in total expenditure, which could be evidence of stronger ties with their 
extended family. 
The estimated expenditure elasticities to charities of all households in the top income 
half are below unity, implying that they consider group membership a necessity. This is 
actually in line with the general experience, that religious participation weakens (or at least it 
does not strengthen) as a person/household becomes wealthier. However, for households in 
the bottom income half, the elasticity is around unity for the Canadian-born and the South and 
East European (for North American and West European even exceeding unity), meaning that 
these households increase charitable spending probably as a means to improve their status in 
their social group as their income rises. 
Asians are again an exception with households in both income halves treating 
remittances to charities as a necessity. 
 
4.4 Demographic controls 
We now turn to the effects of household demographic characteristics on remittance behaviour. 
We argue that remittances are embedded in the household’s life cycle experience and 
illustrate it with a series of simulations. These simulations are depicted in the Figures 2 and 3 
and are constructed from the reported estimates for remittances to persons and to charities in 
the Tables 6 and 7. In short, for each representative household we place the mean values for 
all the model’s variables (except age and age-squared) and cross multiply by the relevant 




Figure 2 reveals several important features of the remittance experience over time and 
across various population groups. We note that the share of remittances to persons of Asian 
households has the lowest variance over lifetime. Moreover, from all population groups, 
Asian households remit to persons the greatest share of expenditures over the active lifetime 
of the household head (i.e. until age 60).11 Both these could be a sign of contributions to the 
extended family, whose size is more stable over their lifetime. 
Non-Asian households’ transfers to persons increase dramatically as the age of the 
household head exceeds 50. This result may arise as members of the nuclear family (i.e. own 
children) leave the household. The largest transfers are, however, made after retirement age, 
perhaps as inter vivo transfers to heirs. 
 
[Figure 2: about here] 
 
These simulated patterns conform to our earlier reported stylised facts (Figure 1). To wit, the 
Canadian born increase their remittances to persons from an average of CA$ 700/year under 
the age of 34 to around CA$ 1,050 between age 35 and 64 and further to about CA$ 
1,375/year after age 65. Similarly, South and East Europeans increase their remittances to 
persons from an average of about CA$ 900/year under age 34 to about CA$ 1,300/year 
between age 35 and 64 and almost CA$ 2,000/year over age 65. The remittances to persons 
sent by North American and West European immigrant households reach a maximum at 
midlife (ca. CA$ 1,700/year) and fall again after age 65 to about CA$ 1,250/year. While those 
of Asian households being quite stable among age groups, at values between CA$ 1,100 and 
1,250/year. 
From Figure 1 we should further note that the substantial increase of expenditure 
shares remitted to persons after age 65 observed from the simulation is partly due to the 
significant decrease in all expenditures (except remittances to persons and to charities). 
The possible explanation that the share of expenditures remitted to persons increases 
with the number of the close family members living outside the household, is also confirmed 
for the Canadian-born and North American and West European households by the positive 
sign of the coefficient of the separated/divorced dummy. This implies that if the spouse lives 
outside the household or the household head is divorced12, the household remits a 
significantly higher share of its expenditures to persons outside the household 
                                               
11 The F-tests employed confirm the existence of significant differences in means between the predicted values. 
12 The FAMEX marital status group includes widowed persons as well. However, we expect that this will not 




[Table 6: about here] 
 
Another important result is that education negatively affects the budget share remitted to 
persons in the case of South and East European and Asian immigrant households, confirming 
the prediction of the exchange hypothesis (see Cox 1987). Under the exchange hypothesis, 
because more educated migrants have a lower propensity to return, they are less likely to 
invest in home country assets and likely to reunite with their close family members in the host 
country, both negatively affecting remittances. 
Figure 3 depicts the simulated charitable remittances for various households. In 
general all population groups increase their minuscule charitable donations from about 0.5% 
at age 25 to around 2-3% at age 75. Furthermore, all immigrant groups remit slightly less to 
charities compared to the Canadian-born, with no sign of convergence over time. 
 
[Figure 3: about here] 
 
[Table 7: about here] 
 
4.5 Immigration Entry and Assimilation Effects 
We finally estimate the augmented share equation (eq. 7) with the immigration entry and 
assimilation effects. Table 8 reports the estimation results for the expenditure share of the 
remittances to persons, the expenditure share of the remittances to charities, and the related F-
test comparing the immigrant group coefficients (i.e. the entry effects) and the interactions of 
the immigrant group coefficients with the variable for the time spent in Canada (i.e. the 
assimilation effects). 
 
[Table 8: about here] 
 
The immigrant group coefficient for remittances to persons is significant only for the Asian 
households. This indicates that at the time of entry, their expenditure share remitted to persons 
is 1.7% higher compared to that of Canadian-born households (and implicitly also 1.7% 
                                                                                                                                                   
remit. Separated and divorced household heads might remit more because they have a greater number of close 
relatives (i.e. [ex]spouse, children) living outside the household. Similarly, widowed household heads might 
invest more in relations to persons outside the household (i.e. remit more) in order to substitute for their loss of 
social relations within the household. 
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higher compared to other immigrant households). The coefficients are significantly different 
between immigrant groups. The 2  statistic of the F-test being 3.54 and, thus, greater than 
the 95% critical value. This implies the existence of ethnic group cultural differences in the 
remittance behaviour of households at time of entry. 
There is no evidence of assimilation between the foreign-born and the Canadian-born 
remittance behaviour over time. In the case of immigrant households from Southern and 
Eastern Europe, the remittance behaviour difference grows over time. Each additional year 
spent in Canada increases their expenditure share remitted to persons by 6.2%. The 2  
statistic derived from comparing the convergence patterns is 3.66 and thus greater than the 
95% critical value. This implies that there exist ethnic group cultural differences with respect 
to the speed of assimilation to the Canadian-born remittance norm as well. 
Regarding remittances to charities, all foreign-born households remit a slightly smaller 
share of expenditures (0.5 to 0.7%) compared to Canadian-born households. However, the 2  
statistic of both F-tests is lower than the 95% critical value, showing that there is no evidence 
for ethnic group cultural differences in the remittance behaviour of households to charities. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Most studies on remittance behaviour have used household data in a particular migrant 
sending country, thus analysing the behaviour of a culturally homogenous population. The 
empirical results vary significantly between the studied populations, leading to suggestions 
that the disparities might be attributable to cultural differences. However, little systematic 
research, if any, was done to directly test the hypothesis that cultural differences play a 
discernable role in the remittance behaviour of migrants. 
We have tested for cultural effects by comparing the remittance behaviour of 
immigrants to Canada who come from different world regions, and therefore represent 
different cultures. The empirical results suggest significant differences in the remittance 
behaviour among the population groups. Expenditure elasticities computed separately for 
each immigrant group reveal that Asian households consider remittances to relatives and/or 
friends a normal good, while all other immigrants and the Canadian born regard them a luxury 
good. Moreover, running estimations with pooling all population groups and controlling for 
immigrant groups and time spent in Canada shows that Asian households remit to persons a 
greater share of their expenditures at time of arrival, with no evidence of convergence to the 
Canadian-born norm over time. 
 
 16 
We must note that in the Canadian context remittances represent only a small share of 
the immigrant households’ budget until retirement years, most probably because the vast 
majority of immigration to Canada is permanent, with a generous family reunification policy. 
Nevertheless, our findings give additional insights into the transfer behaviour of permanent 
migrants in general and have important policy implications. The differential response with 
respect to changes in total expenditures (or income) suggests that during periods of economic 
downturn in migrant host countries – like the one we are currently passing through  – 
migrants originating form countries with a nuclear family tradition (and/or with more 
developed social systems) would probably decrease their private monetary transfers more 
dramatically. These differences in transfer behaviour will certainly change the geography of 
international remittance flows. Recent World Bank estimations of regionally aggregated 
remittance flows to developing countries confirm these expectations. Remittance flows to 
developing countries in Europe and Central Asia are estimated to have fallen in 2009 by about 
-14.7 percent, while migrants’ remittances to South and East Asia and Pacific by only -1.5.to -
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Population Group (1986/1992; mean values) 
Variable Population Group 
 Canadian N.Am&W.Eu. S&E Europ. Ch.,Asian&Oc. 
 1986 1992 1986 1992 1986 1992 1986 1992 
Female as HH head (prop.) 0.31 0.43 0.33 0.42 0.23 0.32 0.21 0.32 
Age of HH head 45.60 46.69 53.93 54.44 51.13 52.97 42.00 45.18 
Education 2.49 2.69 2.75 3.04 1.94 2.36 3.22 3.18 
Married with HH member (prop.) 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.76 0.72 0.85 0.75 
Single – never married (prop.) 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.13 
Separated/Divorced/Widowed (prop.) 0.22 0.23 0.29 0.29 0.20 0.23 0.06 0.12 
HH size 2.68 2.57 2.50 2.39 3.03 2.75 3.93 3.22 
Home ownership (prop.) 0.56 0.60 0.66 0.66 0.71 0.74 0.55 0.55 
Years since immigration n.a. n.a. 27.58 31.16 24.72 28.30 11.19 13.36 
HH income after taxes (CA$) 36,189 36,404 39,012 37,807 39,966 35,784 43,063 38,213 
Income per HH member (CA$) 13,503 14,165 15,605 15,819 13,190 13,012 10,956 11,867 
Net change in assets (CA$) 1,563 1,737 3,634 1,865 2,432 1,365 -282 1,222 
Remittances to persons (CA$) 988 1,033 1,173 1,711 1,500 1,322 1,227 1,173 
Remittances to charities (CA$) 395 322 557 588 225 309 292 316 
No. of Observations 8,530 7,898 780 594 405 317 233 238 
Notes: prop. = proportion; Education levels are 1 = less than 9 years, 2 = some or completed secondary, 3 = 





Table 2: Prices Indices Across Canadian Regions: 1986 and 1992 
Year Region Expenditure Group 
  Food Shelter HH Op. & 
 Furn. 






1986 Atlantic 82.9 68.2 85.2 75.9 60.3 71.0 77.7 58.3 
 Quebec 87.6 58.4 81.2 74.3 79.1 67.9 71.7 58.3 
 Ontario 85.7 78.0 83.5 78.3 77.3 74.2 75.5 54.1 
 Prairies 84.0 62.2 77.1 80.5 57.3 68.5 71.5 50.7 
 BC 88.4 80.3 84.5 81.7 63.5 71.0 77.6 55.3 
1992 Atlantic 98.2 80.4 98.1 96.5 75.9 88.7 101.3 104.5 
 Quebec 97.8 72.0 96.7 99.7 90.1 90.7 100.1 101.1 
 Ontario 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 Prairies 98.6 75.1 92.1 102.8 77.5 92.2 94.6 95.1 
 BC 104.7 102.0 99.2 99.8 97.9 88.0 97.1 104.4 
Notes: the base used for the price indices is Ontario 1992. 




Table 3: Test for Homogeneity and Symmetry Restrictions 
Commodity Group Population 
 Canadian N.Am.&W.Eu. S&E Eu. Ch.,As.&Oc. 
 chi2 p-value chi2 p-value chi2 p-value chi2 p-value 
Uncontrolled Setting         
Food 5.62 0.018 1.36 0.244* 3.28 0.070* 1.35 0.246* 
Shelter 5.22 0.022 1.05 0.307* 2.14 0.143* 0.87 0.350* 
HH Op. & Furnishing 2.29 0.130* 1.20 0.274* 0.86 0.353* 12.10 0.001 
Clothing 2.11 0.147* 0.38 0.536* 2.37 0.124* 0.04 0.841* 
Transportation 0.29 0.591* 0.54 0.462* 0.04 0.849* 2.85 0.091* 
Heath & Pers. Care 0.86 0.355* 0.92 0.337* 1.12 0.291* 0.02 0.902* 
Recreation & Educ. 2.18 0.140* 0.14 0.713* 0.09 0.770* 1.68 0.195* 
Tobacco & Alcohol 1.04 0.307* 0.01 0.940* 0.02 0.881* 0.31 0.578* 
Remit. to persons 7.08 0.008 0.01 0.941* 1.62 0.203* 0.53 0.466* 
Remit. to charities 8.35 0.004 0.29 0.591* 0.79 0.373* 2.64 0.104* 
System         
Homogeneity 32.43 0.000 5.37 0.801* 9.56 0.387* 24.83 0.003 
Symmetry 7523.39 0.000 531.94 0.000 190.65 0.000 329.48 0.000 
Homog. & Symmetry 10358.00 0.000 795.41 0.000 321.71 0.000 388.63 0.000 
Controlled for Demographic Characteristics 
Food 1.76 0.184* 2.02 0.155* 1.74 0.187* 0.82 0.366* 
Shelter 26.89 0.000 4.04 0.044 3.36 0.067* 0.05 0.817* 
HH Op. & Furnishing 6.95 0.008 1.79 0.181* 0.61 0.435* 13.91 0.000 
Clothing 8.37 0.004 1.36 0.244* 6.39 0.012 0.04 0.849* 
Transportation 0.63 0.427* 0.76 0.382* 0.23 0.629* 2.77 0.096* 
Heath & Pers. Care 3.27 0.071* 0.32 0.572* 1.60 0.207* 1.89 0.169* 
Recreation & Educ. 0.32 0.574* 0.10 0.757* 0.43 0.511* 1.83 0.176* 
Tobacco & Alcohol 1.45 0.229* 0.00 0.976* 0.12 0.726* 1.18 0.277* 
Remit. to persons 10.94 0.001 0.51 0.477* 0.84 0.360* 0.35 0.556* 
Remit. to charities 20.51 0.000 0.79 0.374* 0.05 0.819* 2.02 0.155* 
System         
Homogeneity 72.98 0.000 10.00 0.351* 11.65 0.234* 26.47 0.002 
Symmetry 6289.78 0.000 446.69 0.000 158.00 0.000 291.03 0.000 
Homog. & Symmetry 7426.94 0.000 506.40 0.000 179.64 0.000 337.09 0.000 
Notes: * chi-value smaller than the 95% critical level. 
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Table 4: Expenditure Elasticities Calculated from LA/AIDS, Unrestricted (1986/1992) 
Population Expenditure Uncontrolled Controlled 
Group Group Income Group Income Group 
  all top Y/2 bottom Y/2 all top Y/2 bottom Y/2 
Canadian Food 0.74 0.69 0.74 0.63 0.62 0.64 
 Shelter 0.60 0.67 0.58 0.61 0.66 0.63 
 HH Op. & Furnishing 1.06 1.08 1.07 1.03 1.11 1.06 
 Clothing 1.26 1.18 1.31 1.27 1.22 1.35 
 Transport 1.68 1.57 1.91 1.65 1.48 1.81 
 Heath & Pers. Care 0.92 0.75 0.98 0.90 0.73 1.00 
 Recreation 1.40 1.33 1.46 1.36 1.33 1.38 
 Tobacco & Alcohol 0.93 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.04 0.98 
 Rem. to persons 1.13 1.09 1.32 1.85 1.45 1.95 
 Rem. to charities 0.60 0.40 0.60 1.02 0.84 0.98 
N. American & Food 0.78 0.72 0.74 0.63 0.62 0.59 
W. European Shelter 0.63 0.77 0.62 0.65 0.68 0.69 
 HH Op. & Furnishing 1.14 1.15 1.23 1.14 1.20 1.23 
 Clothing 1.24 1.12 1.33 1.18 1.08 1.41 
 Transport 1.51 1.41 1.63 1.48 1.43 1.47 
 Heath & Pers. Care 0.89 0.68 0.92 0.85 0.59 1.00 
 Recreation 1.46 1.40 1.59 1.39 1.34 1.49 
 Tobacco & Alcohol 1.04 0.72 1.15 1.01 0.91 1.07 
 Rem. to persons 1.11 0.98 1.24 1.91 1.83 1.82 
 Rem. to charities 0.72 0.31 0.81 1.17 0.60 1.20 
S&E Food 0.78 0.68 0.79 0.67 0.63 0.71 
European Shelter 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.55 0.53 
 HH Op. & Furnishing 1.14 1.16 1.20 1.11 1.10 1.23 
 Clothing 1.36 1.27 1.33 1.34 1.29 1.47 
 Transport 1.71 1.65 1.99 1.59 1.48 1.67 
 Heath & Pers. Care 1.00 0.86 1.03 0.96 0.83 1.01 
 Recreation 1.53 1.41 1.43 1.41 1.29 1.22 
 Tobacco & Alcohol 1.10 1.17 1.08 1.10 1.60 0.70 
 Rem. to persons 0.93 0.60 1.20 2.03 1.55 2.31 
 Rem. to charities 0.38 0.37 0.47 0.86 0.30 0.95 
Chinese, Rem. to persons 1.08 1.08 1.10 1.09 1.08 1.10 
Asian & Oc. Rem. to charities 0.77 0.80 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.69 
Notes: Elasticities are computed using the formula  iii we 1 , where iw  is the mean share of 




Table 5: Expenditure Elasticities Calculated from LA/AIDS, Restricted for Homogeneity and Symmetry 
(1986/1992) 
Population Expenditure Uncontrolled Controlled 
Group Group Income Group Income Group 
  all top Y/2 bottom Y/2 all top Y/2 bottom Y/2 
Canadian Food 0.75 0.65 0.71 0.61 0.58 0.59 
 Shelter 0.65 0.76 0.62 0.71 0.77 0.70 
 HH Op. & Furnishing 1.07 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.09 1.05 
 Clothing 1.30 1.17 1.29 1.22 1.14 1.25 
 Transport 1.58 1.60 1.95 1.66 1.58 1.91 
 Heath & Pers. Care 0.91 0.73 0.96 0.84 0.67 0.95 
 Recreation 1.40 1.23 1.42 1.28 1.18 1.29 
 Tobacco & Alcohol 0.89 0.84 1.03 0.91 0.90 0.89 
 Rem. to persons 1.17 1.13 1.28 1.78 1.43 1.81 
 Rem. to charities 0.62 0.31 0.50 0.97 0.83 0.90 
N. American & Food 0.78 0.68 0.69 0.61 0.60 0.54 
W. European Shelter 0.68 0.81 0.68 0.72 0.72 0.76 
 HH Op. & Furnishing 1.08 1.09 1.14 1.11 1.16 1.22 
 Clothing 1.24 1.12 1.24 1.11 1.05 1.24 
 Transport 1.54 1.49 1.82 1.62 1.60 1.74 
 Heath & Pers. Care 0.85 0.64 0.88 0.76 0.51 0.92 
 Recreation 1.40 1.36 1.47 1.27 1.25 1.32 
 Tobacco & Alcohol 1.07 0.80 1.37 0.88 0.80 0.90 
 Rem. to persons 1.06 1.04 1.13 1.77 1.64 1.66 
 Rem. to charities 0.56 0.15 0.50 1.03 0.42 1.06 
S&E Food 0.79 0.66 0.74 0.65 0.62 0.65 
European Shelter 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.62 
 HH Op. & Furnishing 1.12 1.08 1.15 1.08 1.06 1.20 
 Clothing 1.35 1.20 1.29 1.29 1.20 1.37 
 Transport 1.66 1.74 2.04 1.66 1.69 1.81 
 Heath & Pers. Care 0.98 0.81 1.01 0.90 0.69 0.97 
 Recreation 1.51 1.33 1.39 1.35 1.16 1.14 
 Tobacco & Alcohol 1.12 1.24 1.20 1.03 1.47 0.54 
 Rem. to persons 0.85 0.65 1.19 1.89 1.52 2.15 
 Rem. to charities 0.25 0.35 0.34 0.70 0.39 0.81 
Chinese, Rem. to persons 1.07 1.07 1.10 1.09 1.08 1.10 
Asian & Oc. Rem. to charities 0.80 0.82 0.71 0.76 0.79 0.69 
Notes: Elasticities are computed using the formula  iii we 1 , where iw  is the mean share of 





Table 6: Regression Equation Coefficients (OLS) Predicting the Expenditure Share of Remittances to Persons, 1986/1992 
 Canadian N. Am. & W. Eu. S&E European Ch., Asian & Oc. 
 Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled 
Log of Total Expenditures 0.004 0.027 0.004 0.038 -0.003 0.048   
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.005] [0.007]*** [0.007] [0.011]***   
Log of Total Remittances       0.062 0.067 
       [0.014]*** [0.013]*** 
Log of Price for Food -0.459 -0.590 -0.832 -0.516 -0.129 -0.488   
 [0.183]** [0.175]*** [0.654] [0.582] [1.199] [1.241]   
Log of Price for Shelter 0.236 0.260 0.264 0.107 0.051 0.094   
 [0.080]*** [0.076]*** [0.270] [0.241] [0.488] [0.485]   
Log of Price for HH Op. & Furnishing -1.946 -2.614 -2.027 -0.660 -0.181 -1.348   
 [0.804]** [0.764]*** [2.689] [2.402] [4.843] [4.749]   
Log of Price for Clothing 0.302 0.329 0.768 0.392 0.046 0.267   
 [0.135]** [0.128]** [0.492] [0.440] [0.936] [0.959]   
Log of Price for Transportation 0.049 0.051 0.062 -0.021 0.042 0.083   
 [0.040] [0.038] [0.135] [0.121] [0.234] [0.228]   
Log of Price for Health & Pers. Care 0.122 0.170 0.175 0.079 -0.241 -0.073   
 [0.053]** [0.049]*** [0.176] [0.166] [0.423] [0.371]   
Log of Price for Recreation 0.532 0.803 0.023 -0.367 -0.163 0.243   
 [0.293]* [0.278]*** [0.983] [0.888] [1.768] [1.739]   
Log of Price for Tobacco & Alcohol 0.900 1.165 1.448 0.725 -0.100 0.641   
 [0.367]** [0.347]*** [1.238] [1.101] [2.261] [2.226]   
Log of Price for Rem. to Persons 0.096 0.145 0.319 0.426 0.432 0.614 2.938 0.859 
 [0.066] [0.062]** [0.196] [0.210]** [0.438] [0.367]* [1.057]*** [1.168] 
Log of Price for Rem. to Charities -0.109 0.026 -0.323 -0.355 -0.633 -0.655 -4.653 -1.593 
 [0.096] [0.096] [0.290] [0.316] [0.640] [0.533] [1.574]*** [1.726] 
Female  -0.002  -0.004  0.013  -0.010 
  [0.001]*  [0.005]  [0.009]  [0.039] 
Age x 100  -0.168  -0.068  -0.411  -0.501 
  [0.023]***  [0.105]  [0.164]**  [0.895] 
Age Squared x 1,000  0.025  0.014  0.053  0.030 
  [0.003]***  [0.011]  [0.018]***  [0.092] 
Education x 10  0.002  -0.027  -0.047  -0.542 
  [0.004]  [0.017]  [0.022]**  [0.123]*** 
Married (with HH member) x 100  -0.002  0.411  -0.093  4.130 
  [0.142]  [0.584]  [1.261]  [5.898] 
Separated/Divorced/Widowed  0.013  0.016  0.014  -0.005 
  [0.002]***  [0.006]**  [0.015]  [0.077] 
(continued on the next page) 
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Table 6: Regression Equation Coefficients (OLS) Predicting the Expenditure Share of Remittances to Persons, 1986/1992 (continued) 
 Canadian N. Am. & W. Eu. S&E European Ch., Asian & Oc. 
 Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled 
No. of Persons a Member  -0.010  -0.014  -0.014  -0.024 
  [0.001]***  [0.002]***  [0.003]***  [0.013]* 
House Ownership  0.001  0.003  0.009  -0.053 
  [0.001]  [0.004]  [0.009]  [0.039] 
Log of Net Change in A&L  -0.049  0.046  0.135  -0.013 
  [0.028]*  [0.069]  [0.091]  [0.225] 
Years Since Immigration x 100    -0.023  -0.006  -0.405 
    [0.020]  [0.030]  [0.219]* 
Constant 1.753 2.324 1.322 0.486 3.891 1.325 8.450 4.551 
 [0.465]*** [0.584]*** [1.513] [1.542] [2.471] [3.167] [2.722]*** [3.793] 
Observations 16,428 16,428 1,374 1,374 722 722 417 417 
R-squared 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.15 
Robust standard errors in brackets 




Table 7: Regression Equation Coefficients (OLS) Predicting the Expenditure Share of Remittances to Charities, 1986/1992 
 Canadian N. Am. & W. Eu. S&E European Ch., Asian & Oc. 
 Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled 
Log of Total Expenditures -0.005 0.001 -0.005 0.003 -0.007 -0.002   
 [0.001]*** [0.001] [0.002]** [0.004] [0.003]*** [0.003]   
Log of Total Remittances       -0.062 -0.067 
       [0.014]*** [0.013]*** 
Log of Price for Food -0.504 -0.296 -0.541 -0.299 -0.085 -0.042   
 [0.100]*** [0.096]*** [0.400] [0.385] [0.473] [0.473]   
Log of Price for Shelter 0.261 0.155 0.156 0.041 -0.058 -0.067   
 [0.042]*** [0.040]*** [0.166] [0.163] [0.178] [0.182]   
Log of Price for HH Op. & Furnishing -2.410 -1.460 -1.208 -0.192 1.191 1.033   
 [0.423]*** [0.407]*** [1.702] [1.677] [1.921] [1.913]   
Log of Price for Clothing 0.250 0.119 0.360 0.167 0.059 0.120   
 [0.071]*** [0.068]* [0.313] [0.300] [0.375] [0.359]   
Log of Price for Transportation 0.078 0.034 0.025 -0.020 -0.070 -0.043   
 [0.021]*** [0.020]* [0.083] [0.081] [0.091] [0.082]   
Log of Price for Health & Pers. Care 0.155 0.120 0.109 0.073 -0.131 -0.105   
 [0.027]*** [0.026]*** [0.114] [0.114] [0.145] [0.141]   
Log of Price for Recreation 0.842 0.487 0.172 -0.162 -0.709 -0.615   
 [0.154]*** [0.149]*** [0.609] [0.601] [0.676] [0.708]   
Log of Price for Tobacco & Alcohol 0.985 0.601 0.719 0.258 -0.426 -0.370   
 [0.193]*** [0.185]*** [0.800] [0.782] [0.939] [0.907]   
Log of Price for Rem. to Persons -0.204 -0.033 0.046 0.211 -0.046 -0.011 -2.938 -0.859 
 [0.041]*** [0.042] [0.111] [0.121]* [0.114] [0.110] [1.057]*** [1.168] 
Log of Price for Rem. to Charities 0.348 0.089 0.027 -0.223 0.091 0.042 4.653 1.593 
 [0.059]*** [0.062] [0.159] [0.174] [0.143] [0.162] [1.574]*** [1.726] 
Female  0.001  0.002  0.004  0.010 
  [0.001]  [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.039] 
Age x 100  -0.056  -0.151  -0.118  0.501 
  [0.013]***  [0.059]**  [0.046]**  [0.895] 
Age Squared x 1000  0.011  0.020  0.018  -0.030 
  [0.001]***  [0.006]***  [0.006]***  [0.092] 
Education x 10  0.030  0.034  0.026  0.542 
  [0.002]***  [0.013]***  [0.014]*  [0.123]*** 
Married (with HH member)  -0.005  -0.008  -0.014  -0.041 
  [0.001]***  [0.007]  [0.014]  [0.059] 
Separated/Divorced/Widowed  -0.007  -0.009  -0.024  0.005 
  [0.001]***  [0.007]  [0.017]  [0.077] 
(continued on the next page) 
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Table 7: Regression Equation Coefficients (OLS) Predicting the Expenditure Share of Remittances to Charities, 1986/1992 (continued) 
 Canadian N. Am. & W. Eu. S&E European Ch., Asian & Oc. 
 Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled 
No. of Persons a Member x 100  0.004  0.076  0.025  2.383 
  [0.021]  [0.097]  [0.088]  [1.294]* 
House Ownership  0.003  0.005  0.002  0.053 
  [0.001]***  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.039] 
Log of Net Change in A&L  0.033  0.015  0.013  0.013 
  [0.007]***  [0.018]  [0.017]  [0.225] 
Years Since Immigration x 100    0.030  0.009  0.405 
    [0.010]***  [0.009]  [0.219]* 
Constant 1.495 0.765 1.040 0.596 0.591 -0.102 -7.450 -3.551 
 [0.270]*** [0.251]*** [0.881] [0.924] [0.934] [1.053] [2.722]*** [3.793] 
Observations 16,428 16,428 1,374 1,374 722 722 417 417 
R-squared 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.16 0.07 0.15 
Robust standard errors in brackets 




Table 8: Entry and Assimilation Effects, 1986/1992 
 Share of Remittances to Persons  Share of Remittances to Charities 
 OLS F-test (p-value) OLS F-test (p-value) 
Log of Total Expenditures 0.028  0.001  
 [0.002]***  [0.001]  
Log of Price for Food -0.688  -0.261  
 [0.163]***  [0.087]***  
Log of Price for Shelter 0.276  0.132  
 [0.070]***  [0.037]***  
Log of Price for HH Op. & Furnishing -2.686  -1.218  
 [0.708]***  [0.373]***  
Log of Price for Clothing 0.384  0.100  
 [0.121]***  [0.064]  
Log of Price for Transportation 0.065  0.023  
 [0.035]*  [0.018]  
Log of Price for Health & Pers. Care 0.149  0.104  
 [0.047]***  [0.024]***  
Log of Price for Recreation 0.782  0.385  
 [0.257]***  [0.135]***  
Log of Price for Tobacco & Alcohol 1.242  0.508  
 [0.323]***  [0.170]***  
Log of Price for Rem. to Persons 0.171  -0.012  
 [0.057]***  [0.037]  
Log of Price for Rem. to Charities -0.018  0.060  
 [0.088]  [0.055]  
Female -0.002  0.001  
 [0.001]*  [0.001]  
Age x 100 -0.171  -0.064  
 [0.022]***  [0.012]***  
Age Squared x 1000 0.025  0.012  
 [0.002]***  [0.001]***  
Education x 10 -0.024  0.296  
 [0.040]  [0.024]***  
Married (with HH member) 0.027  -0.498  
 [0.134]  [0.113]***  
Separated/Divorced/Widowed 0.013  -0.007  
 [0.002]***  [0.001]***  
(continued on the next page) 
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Table 8: Entry and Assimilation Effects, 1986/1992 (continued) 
 Share of Remittances to Persons  Share of Remittances to Charities 
 OLS F-test (p-value) OLS F-test (p-value) 
No. of Persons a Member x 100 -0.103  0.001  
 [0.004]***  [0.002]  
House Ownership 0.001  0.003  
 [0.001]  [0.001]***  
Log of Net Change in A&L -0.029  0.030  
 [0.024]  [0.006]***  
North American & West European (NAWE) 0.004 
3.54 
-0.007 
0.15  [0.005] [0.003]** 




(0.863) Chinese, Asian & Oceania (CAO) 0.017 -0.005 
 [0.006]*** [0.002]*** 
NAWE x Years Since Immigration -0.015 
3.66 
0.024 
0.49  [0.018] [0.011]** 




(0.611) CAO x Years Since Immigration -0.052 0.009 
 [0.048] [0.016] 
Constant 2.420  0.726  
 [0.522]***  [0.224]***  
Observations 18,995  18,995  
R-squared 0.13  0.11  
Robust standard errors in brackets 



















































































































































































































































































































































Canadian-born North American and West European South and East European Chinese, Asian and Oceanian
 
Notes: Values in 1992 Canadian dollars. 





Figure 2: Expenditure Share of Remittances to Persons by Population Group over the Life Cycle 
 
Source: Own calculations; Family Expenditures Survey (FAMEX) 1986/1992, Statistics Canada. 
 
 
Figure 3: Expenditure Share of Remittances to Charities by Population Group over the Life Cycle 
 
Source: Own calculations; Family Expenditures Survey (FAMEX) 1986/1992, Statistics Canada. 
